

The Command Post

The Newsletter for Negotiators, Incident Commanders and Tactical Leaders

Canadian Critical Incident Association

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NEGOTIATOR TRAINING IN TURKEY

In February of 2002, Staff Sergeant Barney McNEILLY and I had the honour of attending the T.A.D.O.C. (Turkish Academy Against Drugs & Organised Crime) for the purpose of delivering the Crisis Negotiators/ Hostage - Baricaded Persons Course, to members of the Turkish National Police Force and Gendarmerie Police.

The team consisted of Sergeant Alain Girardin, R.C.M.P.-International Training and Forensic Psychiatrist Dr. Alberto CHOY who offered support and assistance in offering the program in such a unique environment. The program was delivered entirely through the assistance of interpreters in a modern and professional facility.

The entire experience was highlighted by friendly, professional and hospitable officers who went to great effort to make us feel welcome and at home during our visit. Their Special Weapon's Team put on a Tactical demonstration to illustrate their skill and competence in performing a hostage rescue. The Tactical Commander attended the course and shared his experiences with the group, relating to his role as Incident Commander during an



Aircraft Hijacking. Everyone was riveted by his account of this very serious and challenging situation, which was resolved through very innovative strategies. This emphasised the training that was being offered and illustrated that it is critical for individual units to come together as a team to achieve a successful outcome.

The course culminated in the practical exercises and demonstrations, which were entirely orchestrated through the utilization of interpreters. Overall the course was a great success and we received very positive feedback and made great friends.

Sergeant Kathy Doughty
Toronto Police Service



President's Message

I am pleased to advise you that our membership continues to flourish. I regret having to advise our Correction colleagues that I have not received any material from either the Federal or Provincial representatives for this publication. We are still hoping for 'clearance' to be given on an article. We will try again for our next publication.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate a number of Police Services throughout the G.T.A. and beyond for their continuing efforts in providing refresher training for their critical incident teams.

Included in these Services are Windsor, London, Guelph, Hamilton, York and Durham Regions. Unfortunately I cannot comment on other agencies or jurisdictions if we do not have input.



You will realise that most of the content in this issue is from Toronto and southern Ontario Services.

We would like to hear from services across the nation. You can contact any of the executives if you are involved in an incident that would be of interest. We will be pleased to publish your article.

Barney McNeilly

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Mission Statement

Dedicated to the promotion of Officer and public safety by bringing together services and agencies to form effective relationships, identify trends, address issues, share information, experiences and knowledge, and provide educational opportunities for participants, thereby inherently building the public's confidence in our ability to provide a service.

Objectives

- To provide meaningful, educational, relevant opportunities for participating members to meet together and address issues of mutual concern, seeking opportunities for continual improvement
- To promote public safety by ensuring that all Services are following the best practices and procedures and that relevant information goes to individual Services in a timely manner
- To provide effective working relationships and information sharing by providing opportunities for meetings on a regular basis with a Canada-wide structure broken into Provincial Chapters
- To ensure that major trends and issues regarding safety and knowledge are identified, discussed and acted upon in a coordinated manner including a bi-annual news publication.

WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE OPP NEGOTIATION PROGRAM?

Since January 2002, OPP negotiators have responded to 15 calls around the province. These calls include suicidal subjects, barricaded subjects, high risk warrants and labour disputes. For the last few years, fifteen calls has been the average number of calls to date.

Over the past year the following program initiatives have been undertaken:

1. Negotiator operations manual (see below)
2. New clothing for cold weather
3. New multi-function secondary headsets
4. Negotiator interview guide for investigators (assist investigators with asking the right questions)

1. NEGOTIATOR OPERATIONS MANUAL

Over the past year a crisis negotiation operation manual for OPP negotiators was research and created by Adequacy Standards in Ontario. This manual has been provided to each OPP negotiator for their reference in the field.

THE MANUAL COVERS THE FOLLOWING:

Mandate of Crisis Negotiation Program

Types of Calls Negotiator Attend

- Hostage taking
- Suicidal Person
- Public order incident
- Barricaded Person
- High risk warrants

Selection process for negotiators

- Regional Negotiation Team
- Integrated Response Team
- De-selection

Job Responsibilities of Team Members

- Crisis Negotiator
- Regional Negotiator Co-ordinator
- Team Leader

Crisis Negotiator Call-out

- Roles of negotiators
- Secondary
- NIRT call-out
- Primary
- Team Leader

Command Post Structure-Chain of Command

Equipment

- Negotiator Equipment Requirements
- Negotiator Telephone Kit
- Personal Tape Recorder
- Loud Hailer
- Logbook
- Situation Boards
- Two-way Radios
- Tape recording
- Clothing

Active Listening

- Attending
- Paraphrasing
- Association
- Probing or Open-end Questions
- Interpreting
- "I" Messages
- Reflection of Feelings
- Summarizing
- Effective Pauses
- Confrontation

Suicide Intervention

- Risk Indicators
- Suicide Threat Assessment
- Suicide Reference

Psychiatric/ Psychological Assistance

Stockholm Syndrome

Third Party Intermediaries (TPI's)

Changing Team

Surrender Plan

Debriefing

Negotiator Interview Guide for Investigators

Required Reports

- Occurrence Notification Report
- HOBAS
- CN Activity log
- Semi annual training report

Training

Court Attendance

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THE CCIA'S WEBSITE ADDRESS



The Command Post staff invites you to visit the Canadian Critical Incident Association's website at www.commandpost.tv for updated notes on recent inquiries and information sharing, or e-mail us at info@commandpost.tv

CRANBROOK — CALGARY

On October 28, 2001, at approx 1740 hours, a 52 year old male named Bill invited his estranged wife to visit him at his apartment in Sparwood, BC. The wife agreed to go to the apartment because her son and his girlfriend were already there. As they visited and it became apparent their conversation was going nowhere. The son, girlfriend and wife began leaving the apartment. The son and girlfriend exited the apartment, at which time Bill closed and locked the door, and jammed a chair under the doorknob. The wife was trapped in the apartment.

Bill then went to the closet and pulled out a “sawed off” 30-30 rifle. He told his estranged wife that he was going to shoot them both. Bill had been drinking heavily and allegedly consumed at least 9 or 10 beer within an hour. Bill forced his estranged wife to have sex with him. Bill shot one round out the window hitting a parked truck. A second round was fired in the apartment, hitting the television. He pushed the estranged wife around with the barrel of the gun. After forcing her to have sex with him the third time, he agreed to let her go. He stated he could not shoot her because he loved her too much. Bill remained barricaded inside the apartment. During this time, Bill was characterized as aggressive and upset.

Bill and his wife had separated after 34 years of marriage. She had told him there was no chance of reconciliation. Bill had lost his trucking business to bankruptcy. He generally had poor relationships with family members, to the extent that two of his sons refused to acknowledge him as their father. He was not a drinker, but on this occasion was drinking heavily. In the recent past, it was alleged he had been stalking his estranged wife, and had threatened to kill family members. Bill had no criminal record.

THE SITUATION WAS “HIGH RISK”:

- a) the subject has deliberately committed an action which would cause a confrontation with police;
- b) the victim, who had been released, had been specifically selected by the subject;
- c) there was a past history between the subject and the victim;
- d) there had been direct threats of injury to the victim with no substantive demands;

- e) there was a history of such events, as Bill had allegedly stalked the victim and made threats to the family;
- f) multiple life stressors existed, separation and job loss;
- g) Bill lacked family support;
- h) Bill had provided an indirect will, as he had only the day before signed his truck over to his son;
- i) the subject had verbalized his intent to commit suicide.

At approx 21:00 Cranbrook ERT were at the scene with two negotiators. As Bill had no telephone in his apartment, Cranbrook ERT members entered into a brief negotiation from outside the apartment door during which time the subject reinforced that he was not coming out. Bill’s wish was for police to enter the apartment and kill him, or he would kill himself because he had nothing to live for.

Bill refused to accept the field phone through the front apartment door. After midnight, Cranbrook ERT were able to safely deliver the field phone via the bedroom window. Heat and light to the apartment were cut.

At approximately 03:00 hours, negotiators were able to make first contact with Bill on the field phone. Bill was agitated and remained determined in his position that he had nothing to live for. The most important thing in his life was his wife, and she no longer wanted him. If he came out, he was convinced that as a result of his actions he would end up behind bars. He had no work and had lost his business. Bill was intent on being killed by police or committing suicide in the apartment. Negotiations were intermittent. Arrangements were made to deliver cigarettes through the balcony window. Bill continued to consume alcohol through the early morning. Bill’s last demand from Cranbrook negotiators was to get his sister down to the scene so he could talk to her on the phone. Bill said he had something he had to tell her. Bill said that unless his sister was available, there was no point in calling him back.

At approximately 07:30 hours, Cranbrook ERT and negotiators were relieved by Calgary ERT and three negotiators. The Calgary ERT team were in place by approximately 0900 hours. During this time of transition, negotiators decided not to bother Bill, as it was believed he was sleeping and that his might be beneficial.

Bill then went to the closet and pulled out a “sawed off” 30-30 rifle ...”

CRANBROOK — CALGARY, CONT'D

At approximately 09:00 hours, Bill initiated contact with Calgary negotiators. He immediately wanted to know if his sister was available. Though the subject was initially demanding and uncooperative, his level of agitation appeared to have declined.

Following initial contact, the following tactics were applied:

- a) Early contact focussed on active listening and rapport building;
- b) Bill was reframed as a person in crisis rather than a criminal;
- c) When Bill brought up going to jail, the weapons related offences were minimized, and the sex related offences were never discussed;
- d) Being arrested, taken into custody by police and investigated was discussed in real terms;
- e) It was determined that Bill's sister, brother in law, and grandchildren were the most important people in his life. This relationship was reinforced. The term "Grandpa" was used whenever the opportunity arose;
- f) Bill was told that his sister and brother in law wanted to speak to him and see him, but they were scared to do so under these conditions. Bill needed to change the situation to see them;
- g) Bill was told that police could facilitate him seeing his sister and brother in law, if he came out safely;
- h) Two audio tapes were played to Bill. The first from his sister, in which she briefly stated she loved him and wanted him to come out safely. The second from his brother in law, reinforcing the need for him to come out safely:
 - i) this was used as a positive police action, as Bill was told police had gone out of our way to deliver not one, but two people to support him.
- i) When rapport appeared strong, it was tested. Negotiators suggested it was time to take a break in the conversation, and that Bill should do some thinking. Bill was **told** to call back at a specified time, and to promise he would do so:
 - i) when Bill returned the call on time, it was a clear sign of progress. A promise had been solicited.

"... his level of agitation appeared to have declined ..."

Bill had responded to a subtle demand by negotiators;

- ii) when Bill returned the call, he was labelled as an honourable man who "kept his word".

While these tactics were being applied, it became apparent that the subject's position had shifted from HIGH RISK to EXPRESSIVE. On several occasions he broke down and began to cry. The discussion became one which was focussed on crisis intervention.

At one point, the intervention took a quick turn. Bill set a deadline of 10:30, if the heat was not turned on he would light the china cabinet on fire. This demand was talked through, and the issue of the heat never came up again. When Bill deliberately attempted to set up obstacles, he was asked directly as to why whenever progress made, he was "pushing back" and being uncooperative. To this, he

consistently had no answer.

The subject brought up the issue of getting "beat up" if he came out. His safety was guaranteed. It was agreed that if he came out:

- a) He would be allowed to see his sister and his brother in law;
- b) He would receive necessary medical attention;
- c) He would be taken to the police station and investigated for what had taken place.

At approximately 11:30, Bill said he was willing to come out, if he could surrender to the primary negotiator. An agreement was made that the subject would toss the rifle off of the balcony, and on the negotiators instructions he would exit the apartment door where he would be taken into custody by Calgary ERT.

At approximately 11:40, Bill surrendered to Calgary ERT in the hallway. The subject obeyed all instructions and offered no resistance upon arrest. Measures were taken to insure he was able to meet with his sister and brother in law.

Charges are pending.

Cpl. Terry Zeniuk
RCMP Calgary



MATULA NEGOTIATION — WINDSOR, ONTARIO

On Monday November 5th 2001, 21 yr old Cezary Matula of Troy, Michigan, came over to Windsor, Ontario. Upon his arrival, he attended the casino.

Afterwards, he checked into a downtown hotel. The hotel desk clerk noticed that he appeared to be very happy, and was carrying a large sum of American money. Matula told the desk clerk that he was under a lot of stress at home, and that this was the closest place where he could relive the stress.

On Tuesday, 6th November 2001 at approximately 5:00pm the same desk clerk spoke to Matula again. This time, Matula looked depressed. The clerk asked if he was okay, where upon he advised that he had lost at the casino. Matula then settled his bill and returned to his room. Twenty minutes later he was back at the desk where he asked for some paper. Matula then went to the liquor store, and again returned to his room with a bottle of vodka.

At 8:30pm patrol officers were dispatched to The Royal Windsor Terrace, a hotel 2 blocks from Matulas' hotel. A male party had broken a window, which led to the rooftop of the Royal Windsor Terrace. This building is a 26-floor condominium located in downtown Windsor. The male was threatening to jump. Upon the officers' arrival, the officers observed the male, who was later identified as Cezary Matula standing on the ledge. He was speaking to someone on his cell phone in Polish. One of the attending officers also spoke Polish, and immediately gained a rapport with Matula. Matula advised the officer that he wanted to kill himself for a number of reasons. Namely his green card expired in 2009, and he would be deported back to Poland. Further, he had lost \$5,000.00 at the casino.

At 9:00pm a negotiator and a detective attended the scene and commenced formal negotiations. The Polish officer also remained to assist the negotiators. Matula advised the negotiator that the reason he would be deported in 2009 was due to a felony charge in the United States. Matula stated that he lived at home, and that he got along well with his parents, and had no relationship issues. He did not have a current job, and felt that this was not important.

Officers began checking downtown hotels in an effort to find Matulas hotel room, and gain further information about him, to assist the negotiators. Officers

eventually found Matulas room, with a suicide note, and a half bottle of vodka. Also was a map of downtown Windsor, with various buildings circled. Contained within the note Matula advised where he could be found and that he would jump off the building at 11:00pm, after he spoke with his mother. This note and information was brought to the scene.

Matula would walk along the ledge, which was approximately 10 inches wide. He would hop up and down off the ledge, spin around and then sit with his feet over the ledge. Matula would stand up on the ledge, and look down. He stated that he had checked out the high-rise buildings in Windsor and picked this one for its easiest access to the roof.

Because Matula had expressed in his note that he wanted to speak with his mother prior to jumping, his cell phone was 'blocked' so that he could not make any calls. When asked, he stated that he was willing to speak to a psychologist.

Shortly afterwards, a third negotiator attended the scene with a psychologist, with Matula willing to speak with him. Throughout the negotiations Matula would be relaxed and talkative. He would then become agitated, and start yelling at the negotiators. All this time he

would be on and off the ledge.

At one point during his agitated state, he said that he would come down if the officers would give him a gun. He was offered an empty firearm, but he declined. Matula then became aggressive, yelling at the negotiators. He wanted to know what would happen if he started spitting at the negotiators. Matula reached around his back and came around as if he was pointing a firearm at the negotiators. Matula tried to get the negotiators to rush him. It was felt that Matula was trying to commit "suicide by cop". When this tactic did not work, he became even more agitated. He was upset that he could not contact his mother. Matula congratulated the negotiators for talking him through his 11:00pm deadline.

At this time, Matula took out his rosary and put it around his neck, praying. He took off his coat, and threw it with other personal belongings over the ledge. He stopped talking and proceeded to the southwest corner of the roof, and jumped up onto the ledge. He was looking down, and leaning forward. Negotiators tried to communicate with him, but he did not respond. Matula was then offered another cell phone. He

"He would come down ... if the officers would give him a gun"

MATULA NEGOTIATION, CONT'D

jumped off the ledge but would not pick up the phone that was on the ground of the roof.

Matula ordered everyone off the roof except for the two negotiators. These officers were able to negotiate with him. Matula again became very agitated. He kicked out another window. During this time people living in the next apartment building, as well as spectators from the ground were heckling him.

Matula still wanted to speak with his mother. His parents eventually arrived at the scene, and Matula was advised of this. He was advised that he could speak with them if he wanted to, but he had to come into the building to do so. It was still felt that if he spoke to his mother, he would jump.

Despite the cold windy weather conditions, the negotiators were able to remain calm and patient with Matula during his aggravated state. The negotiators continued speaking with him, slowly calming him down. They were able to wear him down, and gaining his trust and confidence. At 2:20am Matula gave up, walked inside the building, where he spoke with his mother. He was later arrested under the Mental Health Act, and transported to a local hospital, and eventually to a medical facility in Michigan.

Unfortunately, a week later, Matula put a gun to his head and killed himself.

Sgt Don Williams
Det Mike Langlois
Det Brad Hill
Windsor Police



TRAINING AT TORONTO ETF

It has been recognised for sometime throughout history, "That the best form of welfare for troops is first class training". The Toronto Police Service Emergency Task Force (Tactical Response Team) has been in existence for 35 years at the time of writing, and has attended many and varied incidents over the units history. (508 incidents in 2001). What is gained from this statistic, is valued experience that can only be obtained from operational call out. The ETF Training Section attributes it's success to being able to review and analyse these incidents, then challenge the team's skills in training, by subjecting them to the diverse and often complex situations that they may encounter on the street. The Toronto ETF consists of six full time Tactical Teams, an Explosive Disposal Unit, and a full time Training Section consisting of 2 Sergeants and 6 Constables. Sgt Walker is the section head responsible for co-ordinating the training curriculum for the six Special weapons Teams within the unit, and Sgt Devine is the section head responsible for co-ordinating training for external squads and other Police Services. The Instructors within the training section have on average spent approximately 7-10 years at the unit in an operational capacity before going into training. They have a wealth of operational knowledge, and as instructors have also received certification in the numerous core competency skills for Tactical Response Teams. The support from command and the various contacts within the industry have given the ETF training section the privilege to attend the likes of Dwyer Hill (JTF II Sniper, and Rappel Master course); FBI (firearms instructor school, Basic/advanced Sniper); Los Angeles Metro Swat (Dynamic Entry, Stealth); Royal Ulster Constabulary, Belfast N. Ireland (Tactical assault, Close Personal Protection) to observe methods and review

procedures in tactical resolution. Subsequently the ETF training curriculum is recent, relevant, and as diverse as the aforementioned services. The External training section is primarily tasked with providing training for Perimeter Control Containment Teams and Tactical Response Teams across North America on a "cost recovery" basis.

The training calendar annually consists of facilitating the following courses;

- *Basic Tactical Orientation Course 5 weeks duration, held at LFCA TC Meaford (DND Land forces Central Infantry Training Base)*
- *Hostage Rescue Course, 2 weeks duration held at ETF base in Toronto, Ontario*
- *Close Protection Course 2 weeks duration held at ETF base in Toronto.*
- *Rappel Instructor, and Rappel Master courses each 1-week duration held at ETF base Toronto*
- *Basic + Advance Sniper course also 1 week each in duration, held at LFCA TC Meaford (DND Land Forces Central Infantry Training Base)*

External training also facilitates various squads other than tactical teams seeking specialised training, for instance; Drug Squads seeking Raid planning + Dynamic Entry Courses, breaching courses, Mobile Support Surveillance, Provincial Rope Squad, and the Gun Task Force seeking training in High Risk Vehicle Takedowns.

The ETF has at present trained over 25 Police Services.

Sgt. Philip Devine
Toronto ETF



Time, Talk, Teargas

On the weekend of March 22nd 2002 the provincial Conservative Party held its leadership convention at the Toronto Convention Center in downtown Toronto. The Toronto Police service with assistance from the O.P.P. and other GTA police agencies were tasked with policing this event. The TPS Public safety Unit was the lead agency and it was in support of this unit that the Emergency Task Force was assigned.

The mission statement for the weekend was to provide a safe environment for both the police and the public and to facilitate lawful demonstration. On the evening of March 22nd a crowd of 250-300 protestors took to the streets and began to march towards the convention centre. The crowd was becoming increasingly more agitated, the PSU deployed in an attempt to control the group. As the protestors were held at Yonge St. and Victoria a splinter group broke off and crossed the line from lawful demonstration to unlawful

act. In an effort to heighten awareness of the plight of the homeless this group forced their way into an empty three story factory type building.

Once inside the building the demonstrators hung banners and began to broadcast their message using loud hailers. The situation had transformed from crowd management to barricaded suspects. Our intelligence was limited as to the number of suspects, weapons if any and the nature of the barricade. However it was, in a very real sense, a typical tactical response.

Due to the potential number of suspects the on scene special weapons team (SWT) requested a second team attend. There was good containment of the building and the suspects were obviously making no attempt to leave. A tactical plan was developed by the SWT and presented to the Incident Commander for approval. Very simply the plan was to show a progression of force. First the suspects would be asked to leave the building. If this was not successful tear gas would be deployed to force the occupants out and finally the team would enter with PSU support and physically remove the suspects.

Contact was made with the suspects by the Incident Commander using



a loud hailer instructing them to vacate the building. This resulted in 4 persons leaving who were immediately taken into custody. At this point the second SWT had arrived and Sgt's May and Barredo discussed their gas plan. After several more attempts to coax the suspects into leaving the building the tear gas plan was initiated. Four 37mm gas ferrets were fired into the third floor of the building. Several people decided it was now time to leave however our intelligence still indicated that there were 20 or more people still inside. A second delivery of tear gas was deployed. More people then exited. Finally we learned that a hold out group was still hiding in the back of the building. A deployment of two more ferrets drove the remaining suspects out of the building. The SWT then entered and cleared the building before declaring the scene safe.

A total of 47 people were removed from the building without incident. This incident reinforces the principles of time, talk and teargas. What could have developed into a violent physical confrontation was concluded without any injuries on either side.



Chris May
Toronto, ETF



Cambridge, Ontario

At 1430 hrs, on the 22 January 2002, a male from an address in the city of Cambridge was on the phone with the Crisis Unit, stating that the Police were at his door. He advised that he had knives taped to his wrists, and that he was ready to fight. He revealed to the crisis worker, that he was afraid of the Police and will use the people in his apartment as "cover." He also stated that he had built some explosive devices to keep the Police at bay.

The Waterloo Regional Police Emergency Response Unit set up containment on the building within minutes. Crisis Negotiators were called and a decision was made to have them respond to the Crisis Unit instead of the command post. It was our belief, it would be better to work with other trained

professionals that were still on the phone with the suspect rather than locking down the lines and starting negotiations fresh.

The Negotiators immediately asked the Crisis staff if a psychiatrist had been called to offer his/her opinion on the situation. The negotiators were informed, "why didn't we think of that." A psychiatrist that had been seeing the suspect and had spoken to him by phone earlier was called and offered this valuable insight - he is an odd man and goes on about getting rid of the government. Although threats to harm others were made during the conversation, the psychiatrist believed that the suspect's bark was worse than his bite. The final pearl of wisdom was that we should "walk away because he isn't a threat." The negotiator advised the psychiatrist that he wouldn't be able to convince the ERU to do that.

Needless to say we maintained our presence, and got the suspects attention. A trained member of the ERU through an open window conducted negotiations. Eventually, the male suspect surrendered peacefully.

Since then the hospital that the Crisis Unit works from has expressed concern about our presence in the Unit, and that we have the ability to "lock down" telephone lines and reroute calls to a number of our choice. What has not been said is that at this time an inquest was ongoing over the suicides of three men receiving psychiatric treatment in local hospitals.

Our course of action was clear, proper and justified. The lesson learned, is that we will only use the services of professionals that we trust.

Sgt. Bruce Tucker,
E.R.U. Waterloo
Regional Police Service



REMINDER!

Crisis situations necessitate decision making that may have a positive or negative results. Some are easy, some difficult, and at the end of the day, these decisions may be challenged. A guide to follow with respect to the action taken, would be to ask yourself the following questions:

Was it reasonable?

Was it necessary?

Was it risk effective?

Clear articulation of the above may assist in the decision making process.

Tactical Training Calendar

Toronto Police Service — ETF

June 10 - 14

Rappel Instructor

Oct. 7 - 11

Rappel Instructor

Oct. 7 - Nov. 8

Basic Tactical Course

Dates and Fees will be announced!

Requests for training or registering members on course, services are to send a letter of request to Chief of Police, Julian Fantino, and c.c. the letter to OIC of the ETF, S/Insp. Tom Browning.

These pages are dedicated for articles from Tactical Units. Please forward your articles on incidents of interest to : info@commandpost.tv

EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED BEHAVIOUR

MENTAL ILLNESSES: BIPOLAR DISORDER

This is the third article in a series on emotional disturbance. Previous articles have discussed the mental illnesses schizophrenia and major depressive disorder.

Bipolar disorder, which had previously been known as manic depression, is a mental illness that is categorized as one of the mood disorders. Like major depression and the other mood disorders, the primary recognized alteration in normal functioning that characterizes this condition is a sustained and pathological change in mood or emotion. In major depression, sufferers experience a significant and typically pervasive drop in their regular mood state. This drop may have an insidious onset but leads to intense feelings of sadness, anxiety, and / or irritability that are sustained over at least a couple of weeks. Related to this are alterations of physiological functioning and thinking. This constellation of changes will typically lead to a disruption of normal functioning. People with major depressive disorder will experience multiple episodes of this type of depression throughout their lives.

In classic bipolar disorder (also known as bipolar I disorder), individuals will experience major depressive episodes and will also suffer, at other times, manic episodes. Manic episodes are seen as discrete episodes of impaired functioning because mood changes that are in the "opposite" direction of a depressive episode. Persons who are in the midst of a manic episode typically have a significant and sustained elevation in mood such that they become elated or grandiose. The intensity is far greater than what is normally expected in typical human experience. Further, the elevation in mood is not in keeping with the events in a person's life. It is normal to be very happy and elated when one has won the lottery. It does not make sense to feel this way when there has been no significant change in daily life. Complicating this picture of elevated mood in a manic episode is the fact that, for some manic individuals their mood is also very changeable (that is, minute to minute), or their mood is irritable or angry rather than elated and happy. In whichever way it presents, this alteration in mood is not typical of normal human experience.

Along with the mood disturbance, there are physiological changes seen in manic episodes. Individuals will typically have an increase in energy such that they become hyperactive. They will not need to sleep much because of their high level of energy. They may have an increase in appetite or even sexual functioning. Their

thoughts and speech may become rapid and expansive and they may come up with elaborate and unrealistic goals and plans for their lives. Typically, their social judgement is impaired as they appear to have little understanding of just how "high" they have become. In severe cases, persons who are manic will become overtly psychotic, experiencing hallucinations and / or delusions.

Emotionally disturbed behaviour that emanates from these manic episodes can include bizarre, disruptive behaviour as a result of the impaired judgement and the lack of understanding about their own ill mental state. Sometimes the disturbed behaviour is caused by psychosis directly. At other times, persons who are manic will come to the attention of police because of concerns raised by family and co-workers as they begin to worry about the change in typical functioning. Manic individuals may also become violent or suicidal. Aggression is "fueled" by the impaired thinking and judgement as well as the physiological arousal experienced by these persons. Some manic individuals will feel invincible and this can lead to difficult confrontations with law enforcement officials. With the amount of physiological arousal and the possible increase in adrenaline, manic persons may also not respond to pain cues as one would expect and this might necessitate the use of greater force in order to safely contain the person.

Luckily, most persons with bipolar disorder are not typically in the midst of a depressive episode or a manic episode. In fact, the prognosis for normal functioning with this illness is better than for schizophrenia. Most of the time, persons with bipolar disorder are in the "middle" in terms of their mood and functioning: what is termed medically as being "euthymic". There are many examples of highly successful individuals who are rarely impaired by severe episodes of depression or mania as they spend the vast majority of their life euthymic and their illness is not severe or is well controlled on medication. Many famous actors, businessmen, artists, and political figures are said to have suffered bipolar disorder and there has been some speculation about the usefulness of increased productivity and creativity during the upswing part of a manic episode.

Treatment of bipolar disorder is through the use of a class of medications called mood stabilizers. Classic mood stabilizers include lithium, as well as the anti-seizure medications carbamazepine (also known as

EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED BEHAVIOUR CONT'D

tegreto) and valproic acid (which has a number of different names). Most individuals will have a good response to medication and most persons will live normal lives despite having this illness because episodes of depression and mania will be the exception rather than the rule for them. "Talk" based therapies can be useful for education of the person about their illness and for allowing them to cope with this chronic condition that they need to keep vigilant about.

For the Crisis Negotiator and the Incident Commander, it is important to remember that even in the midst of a manic episode, a barricaded person may still respond to classic crisis intervention procedures. Awareness of the possibility of psychosis and/or substance abuse / intoxication will also be

important. Typically, the greatest challenge for a Negotiator with a manic person is dealing with the physiological arousal and possible anger and aggression. Problems with focussing a manic person are also common. Along with standard negotiation and crisis intervention strategies, Negotiators should also be aware of their own speed of conversation as they may need to speak slowly and calmly in order to help slow the subject down. Sometimes, asking simple, metered questions that force the person to stop and think about their answer and directly asking the person to slow down can be helpful.

If you have any questions about mood disorders, please contact your local Canadian Mental Health Association branch. There may also be mood disorder associations in your local area or in your province.

*By Alberto Choy, MD., FRCPC,
Psychiatry*



TASER UPDATE

The Toronto Police Emergency Task Force, along with the Ottawa Police Tactical Response Team, have completed their operational project involving the use of the M26 advanced Taser less lethal system.

The response from the Emergency Task Force members, has been extremely positive with regard to success rate.

The Taser has certainly proven itself to be an effective component of our less lethal inventory at a variety of calls for service including demonstrations and cell extractions.

The Emergency Task Force have deployed the Taser in the Dart/Touch mode 65 times and utilized the device as a force presence 219 times

The Toronto Tactical Paramedics have been an absolute asset to our Unit since their inception, and have been on board since we began the project. They are capable of extracting the darts from tasered subjects.

The Solicitor General has granted indefinite use of the Taser to the Toronto and Ottawa Tactical Units.

However, there is good news that came out of a meeting held at the Ontario Police College in January 2002. Representatives of the Ministry of the Solicitor General indicated that they are looking at endorsing the use of the Taser Province wide. This would be for the Tactical Units only. Some Tactical Services are already gearing up for the implementation of the Taser.

Sgt Gavin Hayes, who was the Provincial advisor on the Taser project, has recently returned to his Service. (Halton Police)

The current Provincial advisor on the Taser is Francis Hobbs, Tel: 416-314-3076.

At this time, due to the recent OPSEU strike and the change in the Premiers Office, no date is readily available for the granting Taser deployment authorization to Police Tactical Units across the Province.

*Sgt. Doug Walker
Toronto Police ETF
416-808-3800*



NEGOTIATIONS — MONTREAL, QUEBEC

THE EVENT

Monday, 2001-04-02 around 8:45 a.m., negotiators Richard Huard and Marc Roussy were advised by the Operational Control Center of a request for assistance from the Montreal Police Service (MPD). An armed man has barricaded himself and a hostage on the third floor of 7198 St. Hubert Street, Montreal, Que.

UPON ARRIVAL

Upon arrival at the scene, around 9:30 a.m., RCMP negotiators Richard Huard and Marc Roussy, from the Critical Event Program, help their colleagues Daniel Barbeau and Michel Lebeau of the Montreal Police Department to collect pertinent information on the suspect and the hostage. From inside the third floor apartment, two men, under the influence of narcotics, are throwing objects from the third floor onto St. Hubert Street. There would appear to have been a fight as the glass to the patio doors is smashed. The English-speaking suspect held two knives and was holding a 40-year-old French-speaking man, hostage. The French-speaking man seemed to be the tenant of the residence. The suspect was threatening suicide, saying he had nothing to lose. He was very aggressive and refused to talk to the first investigator or to let the hostage go. He threatened to set the place on fire.

INFORMATION

The negotiators collect information from the Police officers and investigators of the Northern Investigation Center. These officers witnessed the events and saw the suspect holding the two knives and confining the tenant. They tried to reason with the suspect without success. He threatened to kill his hostage and then himself. According to their information, at around 4:00 a.m. the suspect and his brother argued after taking several hits of "crack". The suspect threatened his brother with a knife. The brother ran off after hitting the suspect in the left eye with a bottle and threatening the tenant who was refusing to let him leave.

PROFILE

At this time, the negotiators "profile" the suspect as **High Risk**. They come to this conclusion because the

suspect is under the effect of "crack", suicidal, armed with a knife and very aggressive.

CHAIN OF EVENTS / COMMANDER

The initial evaluation is difficult for the scene Commander. The information is coming from many different sources. Some is from individuals and some is corroborated. One of the priorities is the hostage. Is the tenant really a hostage?

The commander orders negotiation as the first crisis resolution technique.

This technique resolves almost 88% of incidents without violence or tactical intervention (forced entry). The information the negotiators have obtained is current. This information is transmitted to the Commander and allows him to develop a portrait of the emotional and psychological state of the suspect and to understand what is going on at the moment. To help in the decision making process the Commander turns the "investigation" element over to the Northern Investigation Center. They will determine the identity of the suspect and his hostage. They will also continue the investigation after the hostage situation has been resolved. The Specialized Technical Support team (same as our Special "1") suggests the use of "special technical means" to determine what is actually going on inside the apartment. The Commander approves this suggestion.

CHAIN OF EVENTS / NEGOTIATORS

Negotiations are difficult because there is no telephone inside the apartment to contact the suspect. As well, the negotiators have the same inconcrete information as the Commander. At 10:25 a.m. negotiations are started by shouting from the corridor. The suspect is crying and still aggressive. After a second contact around 10:35 a.m. the suspect lets the hostage leave and the investigators and negotiators meet the hostage. The hostage advises them of the suspect's name and confirms that the suspect says he is through with life and has nothing to lose. He is holding the knife to his stomach. The hostage also confirms the suspect is under the influence of cocaine. By 1:00 p.m. the head negotiator has made some progress and the suspect has calmed down. He says he does not want to go back to prison. He has already been there for a past hostage taking incident in a bank. With the approval of the Commander, the negotiators slide three cigarettes under

NEGOTIATIONS, CONT'D

the door in attempt to gain his confidence. Negotiations with a high risk suspect are extremely difficult and volatile. During the next several hours the suspect experiences waves of rage, anguish and sorrow. Negotiations continue until 3:15 p.m.

RESULTS

TECHNICAL METHODS USED:

Negotiations were by raised voice. The specialized technical support team used technical methods to control the movements of the suspect inside the apartment, and to provide information to the command post.

INTERVENTION TECHNIQUE

The commander authorized an intervention technique (forced entry). Gas was used on two occasions. The suspect did not react to gas. The aggressive barking of a police dog at the door of the apartment did lead the subject to put down his weapon. This was followed by entry of the MPD Tactical Team (same as our Emergency Response Team) into the apartment and the arrest of the suspect.

DEBRIEFING

This experience showed us that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to predict the physical reaction of individuals under the effects of "crack". The use of gas on two occasions had no effect on the suspect. This hostage situation showed that the profiling of the suspect was accurate and the intervention of the Emergency Response Team was necessary. The crisis was resolved using negotiation as the intervention technique. The final result was release of the hostage and arrest of the suspect. The success of this event can be attributed to the close cooperation between the negotiators and the Tactical Team. This is evolving as a valid police technique worldwide. It respects the "use of force" intervention models employed by most Canadian Police forces.

Richard Huard
Critical Incident Program Coordinator



Never Underestimate the Value of Negotiating



The other night while I was on duty, one of our inmates was acting out somewhat. This inmate, unknown to us, had a goldfish that belonged to another inmate. The next thing I knew, the inmate that owned the fish was at our office door, crying over her fish. She told us the inmate that was acting out, had her fish in her cell. When I went to ask about it the inmate told me that she would kill the fish before giving it up. I negotiated with the inmate to save the fish. Between conversations with the hostage taker the inmate would scream, "bye fishy", while flushing the toilet. Each time I went to the cell I would be shown the fish and the inmate laughed. Eventually a few hours later the fish was returned unharmed.

In my report for the incident, I talked about the actions of the inmate and hostage (fish). This became a big joke at the institution and the report was read at several briefings.

I hope this will add humour to the seriousness of negotiating, as this is the first incident I actually used my skills!

Sean McLeod
Springhill Institution



Upcoming Courses @ Canadian Police College

Crisis Negotiators' Course
Sep. 18th — Sep. 27th, 2002

Crisis Refresher Negotiators' Course
Oct. 21st — Oct. 25th, 2002



Tactical Training Calendar Toronto Police Service — ETF

June 10 - 14 Rappel Instructor
Oct. 7 - 11 Rappel Instructor
Oct. 7 - Nov. 8 Basic Tactical Course

Dates and Fees will be announced!

Requests for training or registering members on course, services are to send a letter of request to Chief of Police, Julian Fantino, and c.c. the letter to OIC of the ETF, S/ Insp. Tom Browing.



CANADIAN CRITICAL INCIDENT ASSOCIATION



EMERGENCY TASK FORCE
300 LESMILL ROAD, DON MILLS, ONTARIO M4B 3P4

SEMINAR FOR:

**CRISIS NEGOTIATORS
INCIDENT COMMANDERS
TACTICAL OFFICERS
CORRECTIONS PERSONNEL**

Hosted by:

**THE CANADIAN CRITICAL
INCIDENT ASSOCIATION**

AND

THE TORONTO POLICE SERVICE

**September 23 - 25, 2002
Ramada Hotel and Conference Centre
185 Yorkland Road
Toronto, Ontario M2J 4R2**

**Tel: 416-493-9000
Fax: 416-493-5729
email: ramadatn@total.net**

\$175.00 Canadian (members of the CCIA)
\$200.00 Canadian (non-members)

NOTE: Check web page for registration, agenda and list of speakers.

Tel: 416-808-3800 • Fax: 416-808-3802 • Email: info@commandpost.tv



Calgary Conference

**Hosted by:
Calgary Police and RCMP with CCIA**

**Negotiators Conference for:
Negotiators
Tactical Leaders
Commanders**

October 20, 21 & 22, 2002

Registration: \$180.00

**The Radisson Hotel - Calgary Airport
\$ 89.00 single or double**

For more info contact:

- S/Sgt Dan Mullan
403-519-2394
email: dan.mullan@calgarypolice.ca
- Detective Jeff Massicotte
403-206-4555
email: jmassico@calgarypolice.ca

COURSES THROUGH TORONTO POLICE

CONTACT:
S/SGT. BARNEY McNEILLY
416-808-3800

Requests for training or registering members on course, services are to send a letter of request to Chief of Police, Julian Fantino, and c.c. the letter to OIC of the ETF, S/Insp. Tom Browning.

**TEACHING POINT
 REFRESHER**

**Creating a Dialogue
 The Crucial Opening**

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Calm, steady and clear
- ▶ Simple and nambiguous
open and closed questions
- ▶ Unchallenging
- ▶ Be helpful

**THE
 COMMAND POST
 INFORMATION**

Reminder . . .

to CCIA Members, your Board of Directors and Executives are here to help you. They are your resources and may be contacted **anytime**.

Wanted . . . !!

We are looking for members, across Canada, to be *Provincial Representatives*.

- If you are:
- ✓ willing to keep us posted with recent critical incidents
 - ✓ help us with memberships

We want to hear from you!

Contact: **S/Sgt. Harry Schnurr**
 Phone: (519) 824-1212
 Email: kaslex@sentex.net

Sgt. Lina Crawford
 Phone: (905) 825-4777
 Email: lac@idirect.ca

The Command Post Staff regrets not printing the fine Author of the article "Active Listening and Beyond". If anyone did not recognize the information, it was from none other than Dr. Mike Webster. Sorry Dr. Mike !!



**We want to hear
 from
 you about
 incidents
 in your area!**



CANADIAN CRITICAL INCIDENT ASSOCIATION

Individual Membership Application \$25.00

Name: _____ Rank: _____ Email: _____
Home Address: _____
Agency Name: _____
Agency Address: _____
Agency Tel: _____ Agency Fax: _____ Home Tel: _____
Send Mail To: (circle one) HOME AGENCY
Signature of Applicant: _____ Signature of Supervisor: _____

Service/District/Divisional Membership Application \$100

Federal / Government Agencies — Please ID Region / Name

Agency Name: _____
Agency Address: _____
Agency Tel: _____ Agency Fax: _____
Name of Contact Person: _____ Email: _____
Signature of Commanding Officer: _____

Enclose cheque or money order made payable to: **Canadian Critical Incident Association** 300 Lesmill Road
North York, ON M3B 3P4. Completed applications **MUST** be accompanied by a photocopy of the applicant's
Identification Card or Agency Identification. Applications received without I.D. will be returned. ❖

Canadian Critical Incident Association
300 Lesmill Road
North York ON M3B 3P4